In this paper, we study optimal actuator location of the minimum norm controls for a multidimensional heat equation with control defined in the space L p (0, T ; L 2 (Ω)). The actuator domain ω is quite general in the sense that it is required only to have a prescribed Lebesgue measure. A relaxation problem is formulated and is transformed into a two-person zero-sum game problem. By the game theory, we develop a necessary and sufficient condition and the existence of relaxed optimal actuator location for p ∈ [2, +∞], which is characterized by the Nash equilibrium of the associated game problem. An interesting case is for the case of p = 2, for which it is shown that the classical optimal actuator location can be obtained from the relaxed optimal actuator location without additional condition. Finally for p = 2, a sufficient and necessary condition for classical optimal actuator location is presented.
Introduction and main results
Different to lumped parameter systems, the location of actuator where optimal control optimizes the performance in systems governed by partial differential equations (PDEs) can often be chosen ( [14] ). Using a simple duct model, it is shown in [13] that the noise reduction performance depends strongly on actuator location. An approximation scheme is developed in [14] to find optimal location of the optimal controls for abstract infinite-dimensional systems to minimize cost functional with the worst choice of initial condition. In fact, the actuator location problem has been attracted widely by many researchers in different contexts but most of them are for one-dimensional PDEs, as previously studied elsewhere [4, 6, 10, 11, 20, 22] , to name just a few. Numerical research is one of the most important perspectives [4, 15, 18, 19, 23] , among many others.
However, there are few results available in the literature for multi-dimensional PDEs. In [16] , a problem of optimizing the shape and position of the damping set for internal stabilization of a linear wave equation in R N , N = 1, 2 is considered. The paper [17] considers a numerical approximation of null controls of the minimal L ∞ -norm for a linear heat equation with a bounded potential. An interesting study is presented in [20] where the problem of determining a measurable subset of maximizing the L 2 norm of the restriction of the corresponding solution to a homogeneous wave equation on a bounded open connected subset over a finite time interval is addressed. In [9] , the shape optimal design problems related to norm optimal and time optimal of null controlled heat equation have been considered. However, the controlled domains in [9] are limited to some special class of open subsets measured by the Hausdorff metric. The same limitations can also be found in shape optimization problems discussed in [7, 8] . Very recently, some optimal shape and location problems of sensors for parabolic equations with random initial data have been considered in [21] .
In this paper, we consider optimal actuator location of the minimal norm controls for a multidimensional internal null controllable heat equation over an open bounded domain Ω in R n space.
Our internal actuator domains are quite general: They are varying over all possible measurable subsets ω of Ω where ω is only required to have a prescribed measure. This work is different from [21] yet one result (Theorem 1.3) can be considered as a refined multi-dimensional generalization of paper [19] where one-dimensional problem is considered.
Let us first state our problem. Suppose that Ω ⊂ R d (d ≥ 1) is a non-empty bounded domain with C 2 -boundary ∂Ω. Let T > 0, y 0 (·) ∈ L 2 (Ω) \ {0}, a(·, ·) ∈ L ∞ (Ω × (0, T )), and α ∈ (0, 1).
Denote by W = ω ⊂ Ω ω is Lebesque measurable with m(ω) = α · m(Ω) , (1.1) where m(·) is the Lebesgue measure on R d . For any ω ∈ W and p ∈ (1, +∞], consider the following controlled heat equation
y t (x, t) − ∆y(x, t) + a(x, t)y(x, t) = χ ω (x)u(x, t) in Ω × (0, T ), y(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T ), y(x, 0) = y 0 (x) in Ω, (1.2) where u(·, ·) ∈ L p (0, T ; L 2 (Ω)) is the control, and χ ω (·) is the characteristic function of ω. For simplicity, we also denote χ ω (·) ∈ W when ω ∈ W. It is well known that for any u(·, ·) ∈ L p (0, T ; L 2 (Ω)), Equation (1.2) admits a unique mild solution which is denoted by y(·; ω, u).
The minimal norm control problem can be stated as follows. For a given time T > 0 and ω ∈ W, find a minimal norm control to solve the following optimal control problem:
A classical optimal actuator location of the minimal norm control problem is to seek anω ∈ W to minimize N p (ω):
If such anω exists, we say thatω is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm controls. Anyū ∈ L p (0, T ; L 2 (Ω)) that satisfies y(T ; ω,ū) = 0 and ū L p (0,T ;L 2 (Ω)) = N p (ω) is called an optimal control with respect to the optimal actuator locationω.
The existence of optimal actuator locationω is generally not guaranteed because of absence of the compactness of W. For this reason, we consider instead a relaxed problem. Define 5) where L(Ω; [0, 1]) consists of all Lebesgue measurable functions in Ω with values in [0, 1] . Note that the set B is a relaxation to the set {χ ω ω ∈ W} by observing that for any ω ∈ W, β(·) = χ ω (·) ∈ B, yet B is not anyhow the convex closure of {χ ω ω ∈ W}.
Most often in what follows, we drop bracket by simply using β to denote the function β(·). This remark is also is applied to other functions in some places when there is no risk of arising the confusion.
For any β ∈ B, consider the following system:
y t (x, t) − ∆y(x, t) + a(x, t)y(x, t) = β(x)u(x, t) in Ω × (0, T ), y(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T ), y(x, 0) = y 0 (x) in Ω, (1.6) where once again the control u(·, ·) ∈ L p (0, T ; L 2 (Ω)). Denote the solution of (1.6) by y(·; β, u) as counterpart of y(·; ω, u) but with obvious different meaning. Accordingly, the problem (N P ) p,ω is changed into a relaxation problem of the following:
and the classical problem (1.4) is also relaxed to the following problem
Any solutionβ to problem (1.8) is called a relaxed optimal actuator location. If there isβ = χω solves problem (1.8), thenω is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm controls.
Our main approach is based on the two-person zero-sum game theory. If we are minimizing the cost with two variable functions u(·, ·) and β(·) one after another, then problem (1.8) can be written as
This is a typical two-level optimization problem yet not a game problem. Indeed, in the framework of two-person zero-sum game theory, any Stackelberg game problem which is also called leaderfollower game problem (see, e.g., [25] ) should be of the form:
where it is required that the set E is independent of the set F . It is interesting that we can use the relationship between problem (N P ) p,β (1.7) and its dual problem which is a variational problem when β = χ ω ( [12] ) to transform the problem (1.9) into a Stackelberg game problem in the framework of two-person zero-sum game theory, which gives in turn the solution of our problem.
The main result of this paper is the following Theorem 1.1. 
where Y q is defined in Definition 3.24 in section 3.2.3.
Remark 1.2. The above necessary and sufficient condition is characterized by the Nash equilibrium of the associated game problem. Furthermore, for any solutionβ to problem (1.8), the set
is a singleton and independent ofβ. Indeed, the set defined in (1.11) equals to {ψ} whereψ is the unique solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Based on this fact, we can present a necessary condition to characterize any solutionβ in an alternative way in case the Nash equilibrium is not easy to be determined. That is, ifβ is a solution to problem (1.8), thenβ solves the following problem:
.
(1.12)
All results are illustrated in Remark 3.29 in section 3.2.3.
The case of p = 2 is of special interest. In this case, the solution of the classical problem (1.4) can be obtained from the associated relaxation problem (1.8).
Theorem 1.3. Let p = 2 and letψ be the unique solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Then there exists at least oneω ∈ W such that
whereβ = χω. Moreover,ω is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm controls if and only ifω solves the problem following
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we formulate the problem ( 
From relaxation problem to game problem
Suppose that the p ∈ (1, +∞] is fixed, β ∈ B, and q is the conjugate exponent of p:
. Now let us consider the dual problem of (N P ) p,β . Consider the dual system of (1.6):
where z ∈ L 2 (Ω) is given and y ϕ (x, t) is the output of (2.1). We denote the solution of (2.1) by ϕ(·; z).
Introduce the functional: 2) and propose the following variational problem:
3)
The following Lemma 2.1 whose proof is presented at the end of section 3.1 gives a relation between problems (N P ) p,β (1.7) and (Min J) β,q (2.3), which enable us to formulate the problem (1.8) into a two-person zero-game problem.
Lemma 2.1. Let β ∈ B and y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω) \ {0}. Let N p (β) and V q (β) be defined by (1.8) and (2.3) respectively. Then
Remark 2.2. When β = χ ω for ω ∈ W, the corresponding equality (2.4) has been verified in [24] .
Here we establish it for our relaxation problem.
To transform problem (1.8) into a game problem by (2.4), we need to introduce two spaces. Let 
By the definition of V q (β) in (2.3), the problem (2.6) is equivalent to the following problem:
Furthermore, by the definition (2.5), the problem above is equivalent to the following problem:
where
is a compact operator which will be specified later in (3.11) with Y ⊂ Y β,q and T β,q (βψ) = ψ(0) for any ψ ∈ Y . To sum up, we have obtained the following equivalences:
Remark 2.3. We note that if the optimal solutions to problems (1.8), (2.7), and (2.8) exist, then they are the same. In addition, the existence of solution to problem (2.7) means that there exists
Similar remark can be made to the solution of (2.8).
The problem (2.8) is a typical Stackelberg game problem which has the following equivalent form:
To solve the game problem arisen from problem (GP1) (2.9), we need to put into the framework of two-person zero-sum game theory. Let us recall some basic facts of the two-person zero-sum game problem. There are two players: Emil and Frances. Emil takes his strategy x from his strategy set E and Frances takes his strategy y from his strategy set F . Let f : E × F be the index cost function. Emil wants to minimize the function F while Frances wants to maximize F . In the framework of two-person zero-sum game, the solution to (2.9) is called a Stackelberg equilibrium.
The most important concept for two-person zero-sum game is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. Suppose that E and F are strategy sets of Emil and Frances, respectively. Let f : E × F → R be an index cost functional. We call (x,ȳ) ∈ E × F to be a Nash equilibrium if,
The following result is well known, see, for instance, Proposition 8. (i) (x,ȳ) is a Nash equilibrium;
(ii) V + = V − andx solves the following problem (or equivalently,x is a Stackelberg equilibrium associated):
andȳ solves the following problem (or equivalently,ȳ is a Stackelberg equilibrium associated):
When V + = V − , we say that the game problem attains its value V + = V − .
Returning back to our problem (GP1) (2.9), it is seen that the index cost function is defined by
11)
The first player who controls the function β ∈ B wants to minimize F while the second player who controls the function ψ ∈ Y wants to maximize F . Thus we can discuss problem (GP1) (2.9) in the framework of two-person zero-sum game.
Proof of the main results
First of all, let us recall the null controllability for the controlled system (1.6).
Lemma 3.1. The system (1.6) is null controllable if and only if the dual system (2.1) is exactly observable: There exists positive constant C q,α such that
The inequality of (3.1) is referred as the "observability inequality" for system (2.1).
Proof. When β = χ ω , it is well known that system (1.6) is null controllable if and only if the "observability inequality" holds for dual system (2.1): There existsĈ q,b > 0 such that
with some constant b. In addition,Ĉ q,b is monotone decreasing with respect to b yetĈ q,b is independent of ω. For any β ∈ B, let
It then follows from (3.2) with ω = {β(x) ≥ α/2} that
This is (3.1).
Remark 3.2.
Following from the proof of Lemma 3.1, the constant C q,α in inequality (3.1) is independent of β ∈ B.
Relaxed case
To introduce the operator T β,q in (2.8), we introduce two spaces first.
Lemma 3.3. Let Y be defined by (2.5). For each β ∈ B, define a function in Y by
Then (Y, F 0 ) is a linear normed space. We denote this normed space by Y β,q .
Proof. It suffices to show that
By the unique continuation (see, e.g., [3] ) for heat equation, we arrive at ψ = 0.
Denote by
It is usually hard to characterize Y β,q . However, we have the following description for Y β,q .
Lemma 3.4. Let 1 ≤ q < ∞, β ∈ B, and let Y β,q be defined by (3.4) . Then under an isometric isomorphism, any element of Y β,q can be expressed as a functionφ ∈ C([0, T ); L 2 (Ω)) which satisfies (in the sense of weak solution)
and βφ = lim
, where ϕ(·; z n ) is the solution of (2.1) with initial value z = z n .
from which, one has
In other words,
T k is strictly monotone increasing and converges to
(a). For T 1 , by the observability inequality (3.1), and (3.6),
Hence, there exists a subsequence {ϕ 1n } of {ϕ n } and ϕ 01 ∈ L 2 (Ω) such that
This together with the fact:
shows that there exists
such that for all δ > 0,
In particular,
and
These together with (3.7) and (3.9) yield
(b). Along the same way as (a), we can find a subsequence {ϕ 2n } of {ϕ 1n }, and
This, together with (3.8), leads to
(c). Similarly to (a) and (b), we can find a sequence {ψ k } which satisfies, for each k ∈ N + , that
Under an isometric isomorphism, we can say ψ = ψ. This complete the proof of the lemma.
We define the operator T :
By lemma 3.4, the operators T β,q is also well-defined. In addition, it follows from the observability inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1 that the linear operator T β,q is bounded.
Lemma 3.5. If β ∈ B and q ∈ [1, ∞), then the operator T β,q defined by (3.11) is compact.
Proof. By the observability inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1, it follows that the operator βY β,q →
is bounded. Also by the property of heat equation, the operator defined by
is compact. As a composition operator from the above two operators, T β,q is compact as well.
Notice that the functional V q (β) in (2.3) can be written as
We present an equivalent problem of problem (Min J) β,q (2.3) with the extended domain:
The following result gives a relation between problem (N P ) p,β and problem ( Min J) β,q .
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that β ∈ B, y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω) \ {0}, and q ∈ [1, ∞). Then problem ( Min J) β,q (3.13) admits a unique nonzero solutionζ(x, t), and the control defined bȳ
is an optimal control to problem (N P ) p,β . Moreover,
Proof. Since for any q ∈ [1, ∞), by the coercive, continuity, and the strict convexity of the functional in ( Min J) β,q (3.13), we have that the problem ( Min J) β,q (3.13) admits a unique solution ζ(x, t). We claim thatζ
If this is not true, we can derive from the Euler-Lagrange equation that
Once the claim holds, the above equality implies that y 0 = 0. This contradiction shows that (3.16) is true.
Notice that
where the last equivalence holds because of
First, a direct verification shows that
By the backward uniqueness for heat equation, we have N (L * ) = {0}. Second, we claim that
Since by (3.3), Therefore, the controlū(x, t) defined by (3.14) is well-defined andū
Now, we show that this control is optimal to problem (N P ) p,β (1.7). Sinceζ(x, t) is optimal, we can derive the corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation to the variational problem ( Min J) β,q (3.13)
as follows:
Taking ξ = βϕ(·; z) for any z ∈ L 2 (Ω) in (3.18), a straightforward calculation shows that y(T ; β,ū) = 0.
Ifû satisfies
we will show that
from which we see thatū(·, ·) is an optimal solution to problem (N P ) p,β (1.7) and (3.15) holds. Now, we prove (3.20) . By (3.19),
which is rewritten as
By the density argument, it holds that
It then follows from (3.18) that
Taking ξ =ζ in above quality, we have
On the other hand, it follows from (3.14) that
By (3.23), (3.21) , and (3.22), we have
Remark 3.7. By the equivalence form (3.12) for problem (Min J) β,q (2.3), and the observability inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1, it is known immediately that the problem following
admits a unique solution in Y β,q .
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Suppose thatζ is an optimal solution of ( Min J) β,q that
Replace ξ byζ in (3.18) to obtain
This, together with (3.23), gives
The result then follows from (3.15).
The case of two-person Stackelberg game
In this subsection, we solve the game problem (2.8). The first part presents the existence of solution to (2.8).
Existence of relaxed optimal actuator location
Let
It is clear that β 2 ∈ Θ for any β ∈ B and θ 1/2 ∈ B for any θ ∈ Θ. (3.25)
Then, the problem (GP1) (2.9) can be transformed into the following equivalent problem: 26) where the functional F defined on Θ × Y by (2.11) is now given by 27) and the functionalF defined on Θ is given bŷ
To solve problem (3.26) which is equivalent to the game problem (GP1) (2.9), we introduce the following Definitions 3.8-3.10 which can be found in Definition 38.4 on page 149 and Definition 38.5
on page 150, both in [26] . it holds that
Definition 3.9. Let Z be a topological space. The functional f : M ⊆ Z → R ∪ {+∞} is said to be lower semi-continuous if, the set
is closed relative to M for any r ∈ R. The following Proposition 3.12 comes from the fact:
Proposition 3.12. Let Z be a topological space and let I be an index set. If
is a family of lower semi-continuous functionals, then sup i∈I f i is also lower semi-continuous.
The following Proposition 3.13 is actually Theorem 1.6 of [5, p.6]. 
Now, we discuss the existence of solution to problem (3.26) . To this end, let X = L ∞ (Ω) which is equipped with the weak* topology. In this way, Θ is compact in X.
Lemma 3.14. Suppose that q ∈ [1, 2] and y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω) \ {0}. If ψ ∈ Y is given, then the functional
Proof. By (3.27),
Notice that Proof. If there is a sequence {θ n } ∈ Θ such that
it follows from the dominated convergence theorem, and (3.27) that
The functional F (·, ψ) is therefore sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous. Proof. By Lemma 3.15, the functional F (·, ψ) is sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous. It follows from Proposition 3.11 and Lemma 3.14 that the functional F (·, ψ) is weakly* lower semicontinuous. Under the topology of X, F (·, ψ) : Θ ⊂ X → R ∪ {+∞} is lower semi-continuous.
Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 3.12 and the definition ofF in (3.28) thatF (·) is also lower semi-continuous. By the compactness of the domain Θ under the topology of X, there exists at least one solution to problem (3.26) . Therefore, the game problem (GP1) (2.9) admits a solution in Θ.
Remark 3.17. The set
is not weakly* closed. For example, let Ω = (0, 2) and α = 1/4 and take
Consider a convex combination of β 2 1 and β 2 2 :
Value attainability of the zero-sum game
In this subsection, we will make use of the game theory to discuss the value attainability of our two-person zero-sum game (3.26) . Note that for our problem (3.26),
where F is given by (3.27). It is clear that V + is the value of problem (3.26). Once V + = V − , we can characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium to problem (3.26) by using Proposition 2.5. To this end, we introduce an intermediate valueV and prove successively that V − =V under topological assumptions, and thatV = V + under convexity assumptions.
We denote by K all the finite subsets of Y . For any K ∈ K, set
Lemma 3.18. Let q ∈ [1, 2]. Let V + andV be defined by (3.29) and (3.31) respectively. Then
Proof. For any K = {ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ n } ∈ K, since from Lemma 3.15, the functional F (·, ψ j ) is sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous in Θ for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, it follows from the proof of Theorem 3.16 that there is θ K ∈ Θ such that
This together with the definition ofV enables us to derive
For any ψ ∈ Y , denote
It follows from (3.34) that the set S ψ is nonempty and
In addition, since F (·, ψ) is weakly* lower semi-continuous, S ψ is weakly* closed in L ∞ (Ω). In other words, S ψ is closed under the topology of X. This, together with (3.35), implies that the intersection of any finite subsets of {S ψ , ψ ∈ Y } is nonempty.
By the compactness of Θ,
Hence, there isθ such that
and so
This, together with (3.32), completes the proof of the lemma.
The following Proposition 3.19 is Proposition 8.3 of [1, p.132].
Proposition 3.19. LetÊ andF be two convex sets and let the function f (·, ·) be defined inÊ ×F .
Let F be the set of all finite subsets ofF and
Suppose that a) for any y ∈F , x → f (x, y) is convex; and b) for any x ∈Ê, x → f (x, y) is concave. ThenV = V − .
Lemma 3.20. Let q ∈ [1, 2] and let V − andV be defined by (3.30) and (3.31), respectively. Then
Proof. It is clear that both Θ and Y are convex. Let θ ∈ Θ and let β ∈ B be such that β 2 = θ.
Since by (3.27),
the functional F (θ, ·) is concave for any q ∈ [1, ∞) and θ ∈ Θ. On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 3.14 that the functional F (·, ψ) is convex for any q ∈ [1, 2] and ψ ∈ Y . Apply Proposition 3.19 to obtain (3.36). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Combining the above results, we have proved the following Theorem 3.21. respectively. Then
Remark 3.22. In the original problem, there are two important cases. One is p = 2, and the other is p = ∞. Their corresponding conjugate exponents are q = 2 and q = 1 respectively. It is fortunate that Theorem 3.21 is valid for both these cases.
Nash equilibrium
The value attainability for a given two-person zero-sum game is a necessary condition to the existence of the Nash equilibriums. To discuss further about the solution to the Stackleberg game problem (GP1) (2.9) or equivalently problem (3.29), we need to discuss another Stackleberg game problem (3.30), in other words, we should discuss the following problem:
Define a non-negative nonlinear functional on Y by Proof. It is clear that
By (3.25),
Furthermore, if NF (ψ) = 0, then βψ = 0 for any β ∈ B. By
we have
It then follows from (3.3) and the unique continuation for heat equation ( [3] ) that ψ = 0. Therefore, NF (ψ) = 0 if and only if ψ = 0. Finally, a direct computation shows that
So,
This shows that NF is a norm for the space Y . 
and NF (φ) = lim n→∞ NF (ϕ(·; z n )) for some sequence {z n } ⊂ L 2 (Ω), where ϕ(·; z n ) is the solution of (2.1) with initial value z = z n .
Remark 3.26. By Lemma 3.25, we have the following inclusion:
Indeed, suppose that n 0 ∈ N so that n 0 ≥ 1/α. There are n 0 measurable subsets ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n 0 of Ω such that
The inclusion (3.40) then follows from
where the Schwartz's inequality is used in the second inequality of (3.41) and the last inequality in
Furthermore, for any β ∈ B, it follows from
Recalling that Y is dense in Y β,q and sup
Now, we discuss the following extended game problem of (3.38):
(GP 2) :
Notice that the functional in problem (GP2) (3.44) is strictly convex, coercive, and continuous.
Similarly to Lemma 3.6, we have the following Lemma 3.27.
Lemma 3.27. For any y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω) \ {0} and q ∈ [1, ∞), the game problem (GP2) (3.44) admits a unique nonzero solution.
Now we present Nash equilibrium problem of two-person zero-sum game:
where F (θ, ψ) is defined by (3.27). The following Theorem 3.28 is about the existence of the Nash equilibrium to the two-person zero-sum game problem (GP3) (3.45).
Theorem 3.28. Let q ∈ [1, 2] and letψ be a solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Then problem (GP3) (3.45) admits at least one Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, ifβ is a relaxed optimal actuator location to problem (1.8), then (θ =β 2 ,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium to problem (GP3) (3.45). Conversely, if (θ,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (GP3) (3.45), thenψ =ψ, andβ =θ 1/2 is a relaxed optimal actuator location to problem (1.8).
Proof. In terms of (3.43),
Notice that • Equation (3.47) ensures that problem (GP3) attains its value;
• Problem (GP 2) (3.44) admits a unique solutionψ by Lemma 3.27;
• Problem (GP1) (2.9) admits a solution by Theorem 3.16 and (3.48).
It follows from Proposition 2.5 that problem (GP3) admits at least one Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, ifθ is a solution to inf Remark 3.29. For any Nash equilibrium to problem (GP3) in Theorem 3.28, the second componentψ is the unique solution to problem (GP2) (Lemma 3.27). Thus for any solutionβ to problem (1.8), the set ψ ∈ Y q (β,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium defined in (1.11) is a singleton and independent ofβ. Thus for any solutionβ to problem (1.8), (β,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (1.10).
By the definition of Nash equilibrium,β solves the following problem:
Equivalently,β solves problem (1.12). We thus have all results of Remark 1.2.
Ifβ is a relaxed optimal actuator location, then (β,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (1.10).
Soβ is optimal for this fixedψ. However, if there isβ such thatβ is optimal for the fixedψ, we can not derive thatψ is also optimal for thisβ. Therefore, we can not say thatβ is also a relaxed optimal actuator location. This implies that the condition in Remark 1.2 is only a necessary condition.
Optimal actuator location for the case of p = 2
Though we have derived the existence for the relaxation problem, the existence of the optimal actuator location to the classical problem (1.4) is still not known. A key problem leading the relaxation solution to the existence of the classical problem (1.4) is whether the following equality holds:
To establish this equality, we need to learn more about the optimal a relaxed actuator locationβ.
Recall Remark 1.2 that ifβ is relaxed actuator location, thenβ solves problem (1.12). Thusθ =β 2
That is to say,
In this subsection, we limit ourselves to the case of p = 2. We show that when p = 2, the equality (3.49) is indeed valid, which relies on the fact that the integration orders in equation (3.50) with respect to the variables t and x can be exchanged.
First of all, we present a preliminary result about the following problem
where φ(·) ∈ L 1 (Ω). To this purpose, we define, for any φ ∈ L 1 (Ω) and c ∈ R, that
It is clear that the function M φ (c) is monotone decreasing with respect to c. By
This shows that M φ (·) is continuous from the left for any given φ ∈ L 1 (Ω). Since
the real c φ given by
is well-defined. Hence
It follows from (3.56) thatᾱ
it follows that
By the definition of α φ in (3.58),
This, together with (3.58) and (3.59), implies that
The following result is about problem (3.51).
Lemma 3.30. Let φ(·) ∈ L 1 (Ω). Then the problem (3.51) admits a solutionθ(x) = χ ω (x) ∈ W.
Moreover, the functionθ(·) ∈ Θ is a solution to problem (3.51) if and only if it satisfies the following two conditionsθ
where c φ is defined by (3.55). As a consequence, the problem (3.51) admits a slolution χ ω ∈ W if and only ifθ(x) = χ ω (x) satisfies (3.62).
Proof. For any θ(·) ∈ Θ, it holds that
In (3.63), the third equation comes from (3.60). Hence
Ifθ ∈ Θ and (3.62) holds, then it follows from (3.60) that
This, together with (3.62), implies that
Thusθ is a solution and
A direct computation shows thatθ ∈ W and (3.62) holds. Thus problem (3.51) admits a solution in W. On the other hand, ifθ is a solution, we can derive (3.62) by (3.66) directly. This completes the proof of the lemma. Now we discuss the game problem (GP2) (3.44) for p = q = 2, that is,
where the operator G : Proof. The necessity follows from Theorem 1.1. For the sufficiency, we suppose (3.71). The remaining proof will be split into two steps.
Step 1. Define a nonlinear functional F in L 1 (Ω) by
Then, we can rewrite problem (GP4) (3.69) as the following problem:
Sinceψ is a solution to problem (3.72),
where in above the last step, we applied Lemma 3.33 and used the fact
This, together with (3.73), implies that
For anyψ ∈ Y 2 , it follows from (3.75) that Step 2. We claim that (θ,ψ) is a Nash equilibrium to problem (GP4) (3.69) for anyθ ∈ O(f ). (3.78)
To obtain (3.78), it follows from (3.43) that we need only to prove thatψ solves the following problem:
where β =θ 1/2 ∈ B.
On the other hand, since (3.80) is a quadratic optimization problem,ψ is a solution if and only ifψ satisfies the following Euler-Lagrange equation:
, and Y is dense in Y β,2 , we have
To show thatψ is a solution, we only need to prove (3.81). By (3.67),
Thus (3.81) can be written as
Byθ ∈ O(f ) and (3.65), it follows that
This, together with (3.77), implies that
Equation (3.81) then follows from (3.75) and (3.82). That is,ψ is a solution to (3.79 ). This proves (3.78).
Finally, it follows from Theorem 3.28 thatβ =θ 1/2 is a relaxed optimal actuator location. 
To prove this lemma, we need the following results. γ(x)f ψ (x)dx admits a solution which is denoted asγ, i.e.
Actually, by (3.60), it follows that
This, together withγ ∈ Γf , implies thatθ ∈ Θ. So the claim follows from Lemma 3.30.
By virtue of (3.87) and (3.86), we have
This proves inequality (3.85).
To estimate
we need the following Lemma 3.35. 
89)
In addition,
Proof. Let δ > 0 be fixed and denote f ε =f + 2εf ψ for any ε > 0. Notice that
It follows from (3.91) and (3.57) that
So there is ε(δ) > 0 such that
Actually, by (3.91), we only need to prove that
If this is false, then there exist θ 0 ∈ O(f ε ) and E 1 ⊂ E 0 such that
By (3.94) and (3.92),
So there are E 2 ⊂ E 1 and E 3 ⊂ Ω \ E 0 such that
It follows from (3.95) that
i.e.,θ 0 ∈ Θ. Moreover, by recalling
This, together with (3.95), yields
Note that
The above two inequalities imply that
Byθ 0 ∈ Θ from (3.96), the above inequality contradicts with θ ∈ O(f ε ). Thus the claim follows.
This, together with (3.55), implies that df − r ≤ cf for all r > 0, and hence cf ≥ df .
By (3.97), the infimum defining df can be reached. Thus
i.e.,
(3.100)
It then follows from (3.100) and (3.98) that
So there isε(δ) > 0 such that
Similarly to the proof of Claim 2, we have from (3.101) and (3.100) that for any θ ε ∈ O(f ε ), θ ε ≤ χΩ δ,ε when ε ∈ (0,ε(δ)).
(3.102)
Choosing ε to satisfy 0 < ε < min{ε(δ),ε(δ)}, it follows from (3.102) and (3.88) that Thus the inequality (3.89) holds. Now, by (3.93), θ ε (x) = 1 for almost all x ∈ Ω δ,ε . It then follows from (3.91) and the dominated convergent theorem that
Thus the inequality (3.90) holds and the proof is over. γ(x)f ψ (x)dx. First, we exclude the case c). We suppose that this case is true and obtain a contradiction. So the case c) is impossible. We only discuss the first two cases. If there is a sequence {ε n } such that m (A εn ∩ (Ω \ supp θ εn )) = 0, then we have (3.117) by virtue of (3.116).
If there is a sequence {ε n } such that m (B εn ∩ (supp θ εn )) = 0, then, for any n ∈ N, Using Proposition 3.32 again, we can derive the results of Theorem 1.3.
